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Brown Shoe: Judicial Reaffirmance of Traditional
Clayton Act Standards*
JAMES J. COYLEt
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in the Brown Shoe case,1 the
first major interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Celler-Ke-
fauver amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 signals a re-
application of traditional Clayton Act standards to section 7.
Taken in its entirety, Brown Shoe is a strong portent that the
Supreme Court looks upon the 1950 amendment to section 7 as a strict
proscription of those acquisitions which may significantly lessen com-
petition or tend toward concentration in any substantial segment of
the American economy. In keeping with the philosophy of the Clay-
ton Act, as reflected in the Brown Shoe opinion, such tendencies to-
ward concentration are to be curbed in their incipiency and well be-
fore they blossom into actual restraints of trade or approach
monopoly proportions.
Under this approach, Brown Shoe rejects the broad economic in-
quiry, leading ultimately to a case-by-case determination of the public
interest, which heretofore has found its way into some proceedings
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Indeed, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
almost reiterated language in prior Clayton Act cases, involving other
sections of that statute,3 by emphasizing that "There is no reason to
* Views expressed herein are those of the writer. They do not necessarily re-
flect the position of the Department of Justice. The author has refrained from
discussing the current Section 7 cases in which the Department of Justice is
presently involved since they are sub judice.
t Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.
1. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Chief Justice
was joined by four associate justices in the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Clark
filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented as to the finality of the
lower court's opinion, but concurred in the finding that Section 7 of the Clayton
Act had been violated. Justices Frankfurter and White did not take part in the
decision. The opinion of the district court which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court is reported at 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
2. Material in italics was added by the amendment; material in brackets was
deleted.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be [to] substantially to lessen competition
[between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or com-
munity], or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of commerce].
Other paragraphs of § 7 were also amended in details not relevant to this
discussion. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949):
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protract already complex antitrust litigation by detailed analysis of
peripheral economic facts,"4 and by pointing to the "need for limiting
the mass of possible relevant evidence in cases of this type in order to
avoid confusion and its concomitant increased possibility of error." 5
I. REJECTION OF SHERMAN ACT STANDARDS
Avoidance of Sherman Act standards in merger proceedings under
the Clayton Act was a basic purpose of the Celler-Kefauver amend-
ment. In the words of the Chief Justice,6 "Congress rejected, as in-
appropriate to the problem it sought to remedy, the application to § 7
cases of the standards for judging the legality of business combina-
tions adopted by the courts in dealing with cases arising under the
Sherman Act."
7
The Celler-Kefauver accomplishment in securing a rejection of
Sherman Act standards in merger proceedings is placed in perspective
by consideration of the Republic Steel case,8 the last adjudicated sec-
tion 7 case to discuss the relevant test prior to 1950.9 The Republic
Steel case involved the merger of the third and twelfth largest steel
companies in the United States. In finding that this merger did not
violate section 7, the district court analyzed a number of prior deci-
sions under section 7,10 and came to the following conclusion:"'
Our interpretation of the Act, therefore, should recognize that an appraisal
of economic data which might be practical if only the latter [The Federal
Trade Commission] were faced with the task may be quite otherwise forjudges unequipped for it either by experience or by the availability of skilled
assistance.
4. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 341 (1962).
5. Id. at 341 n.68.
6. Id. at 318.
7. The Judiciary Committee reports strongly support this interpretation of the
Celler-Kefauver amendment. The House Report [H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1949)] states that "the present bill is not intended as a mere reenact-
ment of this prohibition [The Sherman Act]. It is not the purpose of this Com-
mittee to recommend duplication of existing legislation." The Senate Report is
even more explicit [S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950)]: "The
Committee wish to make it clear that the bill is not intended to revert to the
Sherman Act test. The intent here is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their
incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sher-
man Act proceeding."
8. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
9. The only intervening case was United States v. Celanese Corp., 91 F. Supp.
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), which turned on procedural grounds. Subsequent to the
amendment two cases involving the old statute were decided: United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours Co. 353 U.S. 586 (1957), and Transamerica Corp. v.
Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
10. Principal reliance was placed on International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S.
291 (1930).
11. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 123-24 (N.D. Ohio
1935).
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It was known that the Sherman Act had been finally construed in
1911 ... as prohibiting only such contracts and combinations as
amount to unreasonable or undue restraint of trade.... In the
International Shoe Company case, the Supreme Court approved
the same test in cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act....
The result of combinations and mergers may be and not uncom-
monly is to save overhead, increase mass production, reduce prices
and improve the products. Where these beneficial results are used
fairly and are passed on to the consuming public and to em-
ployees, it cannot be considered that... they are within the prohi-
bitions of Section 7....
[T]he burden rests on petitioner to prove that the effect of the
stock acquisition will probably be injurious to the public, and that
it is not sufficient merely to show lessening of competition.
Thus, pre-1950 section 7 seemed to have arrived at a point with
Republic Steel where it was necessary to conduct a separate inquiry
into the ultimate effect upon the public interest in each merger case. 12
It was this case-by-case inquiry into the public interest that Celler-
Kefauver sought to avoid.
In reporting out Celler-Kefauver the House Judiciary Committee
stated that the tests of illegality to be applied under Celler-Kefauver
were intended to be "similar to those which the courts have applied
in interpreting the same language as used in other sections of the
Clayton Act."13 Two months before the issuance of the House Report,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Standard Stations'A had made the follow-
ing distinction between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act tests:
It seems hardly likely that, having with one hand set up an ex-
press prohibition against a practice thought to be beyond the
reach of the Sherman Act, Congress meant, with the other hand,
to re-establish the necessity of meeting the same tests of detri-
ment to the public interest as that Act had been interpreted as
requiring .... To insist upon such an investigation would be to
stultify the force of Congress' declaration that requirements con-
tracts are to be prohibited whatever their effect "may be" to sub-
stantially lessen competition.
12. This reasoning is in sharp contrast to United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where Judge Weinfeld used the
following language in construing Celler-Kefauver Section 7:
The significance and objectives of the Clayton Act and the 1950 amendment
are well documented. In approving the policy embodied in these acts, Con-
gress rejected the alleged advantages of size in favor of the preservation of
a competitive system. The consideration to be accorded to benefits of one
kind or another in one section or another of the country which may flow from
a merger involving a substantial lessening of competition is a matter prop-
erly to be urged upon Congress. It is outside the province of the Court. The
simple test under section 7 is whether or not the merger may substantially
lessen competition "on any line of commerce in any section of the country.'
13. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
14. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1949).
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In rejecting a detailed analysis of peripheral economic facts Brown
Shoe refers specifically to this part of the Standard Stations opinion.'15
Mr. Chief Justice Warren was also specific in rejecting the tests of in-
creased efficiency and public benefits :16
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating whole-
salers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manu-
facturing division of the enterprise, can market their own brands
at prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of
course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations
are beneficial to consumers .... Congress appreciated that occa-
sional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance
of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these compet-
ing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give
effect to that decision.
The following section will discuss the criteria actually applied by
the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe. Certainly these standards differed
in radical detail from those employed in Sherman Act proceedings and
adopted by the courts under the pre-Celler-Kefauver section 7.
II. BACKGROUND TO CELLER-KEFAUVER
Having rejected Sherman Act standards as measurements of illegal-
ity under amended section 7, Congress undertook in Celler-Kefauver
to proscribe corporate mergers and other corporate acquisitions where
the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to
create a monopoly."'17 However, at no point in the Committee Reports
is there either a definition of the word "substantially" or a directive
as to whether the effect on competition is to be measured in qualitative
or quantitative terms.' 8 Thus, the problem under the new act was to
develop standards applicable to cases, such as Brown Shoe, where the
effect on competition was "neither of monopoly nor de minimis pro-
15. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 341 n.68 (1962). The same
footnote contains the following quotation from the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, 126 (1955):
While sufficient data to support a conclusion is required, sufficient data to
give the enforcement agencies, the courts and business certainty as to com-
petitive consequences would nullify the words "Where the effect may be" in
the Clayton Act and convert them into "Where the effect is."
The footnote also contains the following statement:
And the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States on Pro-
cedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases has also emphasized the
need for limiting the mass of possibly relevant evidence in cases of this type
in order to avoid confusion and its concomitant increased possibility of error.
16. Id. at 344.
17. The language of the amended section is stated in note 2 supra, and may
not seem materially different from the language of the pre-amended statute, but
the Committee reports and the Brown Shoe opinion make clear that there has been
a considerable change in the scope of the statute.
18. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962).
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portions."'19 Virtually the only specific Congressional guidance was the
admonition that such standards were intended to be similar to those
applied under other sections of the Clayton Act.20
Although Congress was not specific in spelling out the test to be
applied under amended section 7, the Committee reports left no doubt
as to the purpose of the amendment. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren
stated, "The dominant theme pervading Congressional consideration
of the 1950 amendment was a fear of what was considered to be a ris-
ing tide of economic concentration in the American economy.121 This
is also the dominant theme in the Brown Shoe opinion.
Subsidiary purposes in amending section 7 were the desirability
of retaining local control over industry and the protection of small
business. Congress also made it clear that the acceleration of concen-
tration was undesirable for political and social reasons as well as on
economic grounds.
In its concern over the rising tide of economic concentration, Con-
gress left no doubt that Celler-Kefauver was designed to assure the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts that they had the power
to arrest mergers at the time when the trend to lessening competition
was still in its incipiency.22 This power was to be used against mergers
which "may" produce the proscribed effects, that is to say, the statute
was concerned "with probabilities not certainties.123
III. CLAYTON ACT STANDARDS AS DEVELOPED IN BROWN SHOE
The Court considered the vertical and horizontal24 aspects of the
Brown-Kinney merger separately and this discussion will follow that
19. If the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches
monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated;
but the arrangement will also have run afoul of the Sherman Act.... On
the other hand, foreclosure of a de minimis share of the market will not tend
"substantially to lessen competition." Id. at 325-29.
20. The only other specific directive is perhaps the following statement in the
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949):
Such an effect may arise in various ways: such as elimination in whole or in
material part of the competitive activity of an enterprise which has been a
substantial factor in competition, increase in the relative size of the enter-prise making the acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its com-petitors threatens to be decisive, undue reduction in the number of compet-ing enterprises, or establishment of relationships between buyers and sellers
which deprive their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.
21. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
22. Id. at 317.
23. Id. at 323.
24. "Economic arrangements between companies standing in a supplier-cus-
tomer relationship are characterized as 'vertical.' Ibid.
"An economic arrangement between companies performing similar functions in
the production or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as 'hori-
zontal.'" Id. at 334.
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pattern. Preliminary consideration should, however, be given to the
role to be played by market shares and market structure, since these
factors are to be considered in evaluating both the vertical and hori-
zontal aspects of an acquisition.
A. Market Shares and Market Structure
Mr. Chief Justice Warren was clear that "the market share which
companies may control by merging is one of the most important fac-
tors to be considered when determining the probable effects of the
combination on the effective competition in the relevant market."25
In establishing market shares as the starting point for measuring
the impact of a given merger the Brown Shoe opinion emphasized that
it is necessary to examine market shares against the setting of a par-
ticular market .2  However, Mr. Chief Justice Warren has clearly de-
fined the factors to be considered in developing the setting against
which a merger is to be viewed :27
Congress indicated plainly that a merger had to be functionally
viewed, in the context of its particular industry. That is, whether
the consolidation was to take place in an industry that was frag-
mented rather than concentrated, that had seen a recent trend
toward domination by a few leaders or had remained fairly con-
sistent in its distribution of market shares among the participat-
ing companies, that had experienced easy access to markets by
suppliers and easy access to suppliers by buyers or had witnessed
foreclosure of business, that had witnessed the ready entry of new
competition or the erection of barriers to prospective entrants,
all were aspects varying in importance with the merger under
consideration, which would properly be taken into account.
Thus, the four aspects of the industry to be developed in varying de-
grees depending upon the case are: (1) whether the industry is frag-
mented or concentrated; (2) whether there has been a trend toward
increasing concentration; (3) whether the industry had experienced
market foreclosure; and (4) whether there is ready entry of new
competition. The manner in which these factors are to be developed
can perhaps be most clearly set out if they are considered with respect
to some of the facts presented in the Brown Shoe litigation.
25. Id. at 343.
26. Determination of the relevant markets--that is "the line of commerce" and
"the section of the country"-is of course an important issue under Celler-
Kefauver. I do not discuss this problem because it is not covered by the subject
of this article. However, it should be noted that "Congress prescribed a prag-
matic, factual approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal,
legalistic one." Id. at 336.
27. Id. at 321-22.
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1. Is the industry fragmented or concentrated?
There was a definite finding by the Supreme Court that shoe retail-
ing was fragmented.28 This finding was based upon the fact that
nationally there are about 70,000 retail shoe outlets.20 It is also sup-
ported by the relatively small share of total shoe sales accounted for
by the leading shoe retailers on a national basis.8 0
There was no specific finding that shoe manufacturing was frag-
mented, although there were 970 shoe manufacturers in 1954.31 The
district court had found that a small number of large companies
occupied a commanding position32 Ultimately the Court seems to have
concluded that shoe manufacturing was fragmented but that there
was in fact a considerable degree of concentration as a result of the
"commanding" position occupied by a few of the largest firms.
On the basis of these facts it can be concluded that the degree of
fragmentation or concentration in an industry depends upon the bal-
ance between the number of independent firms in the industry and
the market shares of the leading firms when measured against the
percentages enjoyed by other firms in that industry.
2. Is there a trend toward increasing concentration?
Mr. Chief Justice Warren recognized two definite trends toward in-
creasing concentration. First, there was the trend among shoe manu-
facturers to acquire retail outlets.33 Second, there was the decline in
the number of plants and the decrease in the number of firms manu-
facturing shoes.3 4
Statistics definitely established both these trends even though there
was no corresponding increase in market shares accruing to the lead-
28. Id. at 343.
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id. at 345-46.
31. Id. at 301.
32. The opinion states that "while the 24 largest manufacturers produced about
35% of the Nation's shoes, the top 4-International, Endicott-Johnson, Brown
(including Kinney) and General Shoe-alone produced approximately 23% of the
Nation's shoes or 65% of the production of the top 24." Id. at 300.
33. International Shoe Company had no retail outlets in 1945, but by 1956
had acquired 130; General Shoe Company had only 80 retail outlets in 1945
but had 526 by 1956; Shoe Corporation of America, in the same period, in-
creased its retail holdings from 301 to 842; Melville Shoe Company from 536
to 947; and Endicott-Johnson from 488 to 540. Brown, itself, with no retail
outlets of its own prior to 1951, had acquired 845 such outlets by 1956. More-
over, between 1950 and 1956 nine independent shoe store chains, operating
1,114 retail shoe stores, were found to have become subsidiaries of these
large firms and to have ceased their independent operations. Id. at 301.
Id. at 301.
34. Ibid. "In 1947, there were 1,077 independent manufacturers of shoes,
but by 1954 their number had decreased about 10% to 970."
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ing manufacturers. Indeed the defendants in their briefs made much
of the fact that the market shares of the largest manufacturers, who
were also leading forces in the trend of manufacturers to acquire
retail outlets, had not increased prior to the Brown-Kinney consoli-
dation.3 5
Trends toward increasing concentration are, therefore, not confined
to market share statistics. A decline in the total number of firms or
a trend toward consolidation of manufacturing and distributing func-
tions would also indicate increasing concentration, even if there were
no increase or a slight decline in market shares. The statute is de-
signed to halt concentration in its incipiency; it is not necessary that
it have finally occurred.-'
8. Has the industry experienced narket foreclosure ?97
There was a definite finding that there had been foreclosure of
independent manufacturers "from markets otherwise open to them."38
At the trial the Government introduced testimony from eight shoe
manufacturers who stated that as a result of increasing integration
between the large manufacturers and the large shoe retail chains
they were finding it increasingly more difficult to market their prod-
ucts. They also testified that they had lost sales to former customers
as a result of Brown's prior acquisitions. However, each of these wit-
nesses was forced to admit on cross-examination that his dollar sales
and profits had not declined during the period in which this integra-
tion occurred. Brown also argued in its brief before the Supreme
Court that after it acquired Wohl, that firm's purchases from sup-
pliers other than Brown rose from $20 million in 1951 to $23 million
in 1957. Similarly Kinney's outside purchases increased from $16.8
million in 1955, the year prior to the acquisition, to $19.7 million in
1957.39 Thus the Government sustained its burden of proof by a show-
ing that independent manufacturers were foreclosed from the ac-
quired markets-"markets otherwise open to them."
35. Brown's brief in the Supreme Court contains the following statement at
page 206: "The production shares of the largest 4 manufacturers fell from 25.4%
in 1947 to 21.75% in 1955." See also Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id. at
374 n.9.
36. As found by the Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957), the test of a violation of § 7 is
whether at the time of the suit there is a reasonable probability that the acquisi-
tion is likely to result in the condemned restraints.
37. The question of market foreclosure seems to be related primarily to vertical
situations.
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962).
39. Brief for Appellant, pp. 185 & 188, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
4. Is there ease of entry?
The number of shoe manufacturers and shoe retailers had declined
over the years and the Court concluded that there was no ease of
entry even though Brown introduced a great deal of evidence designed
to show that both shoe manufacturing and shoe retailing could be
entered with very little capital investment.0
It does not appear that a detailed inquiry into the initial cost of
entering a particular industry is necessary or pertinent if the number
of separate firms has decreased during the relevant period. Such a
decline in the number of separate firms will establish that there is no
ready entry into that industry regardless of statistics as to the low
capital investment requirements.
This type of analysis may not meet the approval of the professional
economists but it strongly suggests Mr. Justice Frankfurter's approach
in Standard Stations, in which he placed great reliance upon the fact
that Standard was a "major" competitor and all other major suppliers
had been using contracts identical to the contracts under attack.41
The majority opinion in Brown Shoe also rejected the defendant's
efforts to point to technical flaws in the compilation of statistics and
stated that "in cases of this type precision in detail is less important
than the accuracy of the broad picture presented." In Brown "the
picture as presented by the Government" was found to be "adequate
for making the determination required by section 7: whether this
merger may tend to lessen competition substantially in the relevant
market."42
In summary, there is nothing highly technical or overly complicated
40. The following are typical statements taken from Brown's brief in the
Supreme Court:
[E]ntry [into shoe retail] is easy for a variety of reasons: the small in-
vestment needed for shoe retailing, the ability to achieve success through
many different merchandising methods, the easy access to sources which are
willing and able to supply a wide variety of shoe styles, the demonstrated
ability of retail stores to succeed without substantial advertising outlays at
retail, and the willingness of shoe manufacturers to assist independent re-
tailers in meeting each of these problems. [Id. at 177-78.] The most im-
portant factor in easy entry into shoe manufacturing is the modest capital
investment required. The optimum size plant has from 300 to 500 employees
and produces 3,000 to 5,000 shoes per day....
Local communities may build a factory to attract a new shoe-making firm
to their area .... Factory premises may, of course, also be leased....
Machinery may be leased from over a dozen shoe machinery producers,
including United Shoe Machinery and Compo Shoe Machinery.... The max-
imum machinery rental costs on the most expensive process, Goodyear welt
men's dress, are only $.18 to $.20 per pair, and the average cost for all types
is only 5% of manufacturing costs ....
It is estimated that a new manufacturer should have about $50,000 of
working capital to start production, and, in addition, a firm may have to
spend $5,000 to $10,000 for equipment. Id. at 18-19.
41. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949).
42. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 342 n.69 (1962).
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in the inquiry into the market structure required under Celler-
Kefauver. It would take into account the number of firms and the
degree to which the industry is dominated by a few large firms; trends
toward concentration such as a decline in the total number of firms, in-
tegration between manufacturers and retailers, and increasing market
shares (even where the market shares do not increase, a decline
in the total number of firms and increasing integration may well indi-
cate increasing concentration) ; foreclosure of manufacturers from a
market or foreclosure of purchasers from a source of supply (such
foreclosure may exist even though the manufacturers being fore-
closed are increasing their sales and profits in some other part of
the market); and barriers to entry which would be established if
there were a decline in the total number of firms operating within the
industry. It is a pragmatic inquiry designed to give the court a broad
picture of the market or markets which the merger may affect and
to establish the position of the merging parties within those markets.
The vertical or horizontal aspects of the merger are then to be evalu-
ated in the context of this market setting.
B. Standards Applied to Vertical Mergers
Requirement contracts, tying contracts and supplier-customer
mergers are all classed as "vertical" arrangements. However, the
effects of the various forms of vertical arrangements are not neces-
sarily the same. Under the International Salt case, 43 tying contracts
are likely "substantially to lessen competition" and almost always
violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act. On the other hand, requirements
contracts do not necessarily lessen competition and will not always
violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.4 '
In order to determine whether to apply strict tests similar to those
applied to tying contracts or the more lenient tests similar to those
applied to requirements contracts the Court first considered the eco-
nomic nature and purpose of the vertical arrangement between Brown
and Kinney.
1. Nature and purpose of the vertical integration
Brown's acquisition of Kinney was a consolidation between the
fourth largest manufacturer of shoes, with sales of approximately
25 million pairs of shoes and assets of over $72 million and the largest
chain of family shoe stores in the nation with over 350 retail outlets,
sales of about 8 million pairs of shoes and assets of $18 million.4 5 It
was also apparent to Mr. Chief Justice Warren, both from the past
43. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
44. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962).
45. Id. at 331.
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behavior of Brown and from the testimony of Brown's president, that
Brown would use its ownership of Kinney to force Brown shoes, into
the Kinney stores.46
On the basis of these two considerations the Court concluded that
the merger under consideration was "quite analogous" to a contract
involving a tying clause, noting that "ownership integration is a more
permanent and irreversible tie than is contract integration."'P
The opinion also pointed out that the merger was part of a trend
in the industry, that other large manufacturers had also become sup-
pliers of retail outlets once they acquired them and that Brown was
a moving factor in this trend. However, under the Court's reasoning,
it seems clear that a vertical merger would in all probability violate
the statute if it involves major firms in the industry and will be used
to force products on the acquired firm.48 Certainly it will run afoul
of Celler-Kefauver if it is part of a trend of such mergers.
When the Court speaks of a purpose of forcing products on the
acquired firm it is difficult to conceive just how major firms could
be parties to true vertical integration and not enter into a buyer-seller
relationship. The statement by Brown's president upon which the
Court so much relies is typical of the statements generally given to
justify a vertical consolidation :49
It was our feeling, in addition to getting a distribution into the
field of prices which we were not covering, it was also the feeling
that as Kinney moved into the shopping centers in these free
standing stores, they were going into a higher income neighbor-
hood and they would probably find the necessity of up-grading
and adding additional lines to their very successful operation that
they had been doing and it would give us an opportunity we hoped
to be able to sell them in that category. Besides that, it was a very
successful operation and would give us a good diversified invest-
ment to stabilize our earnings.
Even absent such statements the Court would conclude in most ver-
tical situations that, "A subsidiary will in all probability deal only
with its parent for goods the parent can furnish."50
46. Id. at 332.
47. Id. at 332 n.55.
48. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Harlan observed that: "The vertical
affiliation between this shoe manufacturer and a primarily retail organization is
surely not as the dissenters thought the contractural tie in Standard Stations to
be, 'a device for waging competition' rather than 'a device for suppressing com-
petition.'" Id. at 372.
49. Id. at 304 n.8. See also id. at 332 n.54 and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 523 (1948). There can
be little doubt as to the truth of this language although Brown Shoe seems to have
completely overruled any applicability of Columbia Steel standards to the Clay-
ton Act.
Washington University Open Scholarship
REAFFIRMANCE OF CLAYTON ACT STANDARDS
No single factor would be controlling in determining whether the
parties to the merger are significant firms. The classification of the
company will depend upon the general market structure analyzed in
terms of the four factors discussed above. Certainly a company need
not be the leader in the market.51 Nor does the presence of a firm with
a larger market share offer a defense if the merger in question involves
major companies.5 2 Nor does the discussion in Brown Shoe of the
nature and purpose of vertical acquisitions in any way reintroduce
good business motives as a defense in section 7 proceedings since it
is specifically noted that it is "unnecessary for the Government to
speculate as to what is in the 'back of the minds' of those who promote
the merger."' 3
Thus, Brown Shoe has placed vertical mergers, involving significant
companies under standards which are very analogous to those applied
to tying contracts under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The majority
opinion has also redefined the role of Tampa Electric- with respect to
requirements contracts not falling under the tying contract rule.
2. Application of Tampa Electric
Vertical mergers not meeting the standards discussed above face
tests similar to those applied to requirements contracts under Section
3 of the Clayton Act, as most recently enunciated in the Tampa Elec-
tric case.
In discussing Tampa Electric the majority opinion in Brown Shoe
dispels any ambiguity which may have arisen from that opinion. A
requirements contract may only escape censure under the Clayton Act
if it meets each of the following conditions: (1) a small share of the
market is involved; (2) the purpose of the agreement is to insure to
the customer a sufficient supply of a commodity vital to the customer's
51. Very few of the decided Celler-Kefauver cases have involved the leading
firm. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 186 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
52. The Supreme Court's opinion is consistent with the following language in
the district court's opinion:
Regardless of our economic or other philosophy; regardless of our ideas
or thoughts about how good or how bad "bigness" or "control" may be; re-
gardless of how necessary it may be for the smaller to grow bigger and the
bigger to better compete with the biggest; regardless of all these-the Con-
gress has, down through the years, definitely tightened the screws upon
acquisitions in the effort to prevent mergers and acquisitions where, as now
ultimately defined, competition is substantially lessened, tendency toward
monopoly is created, either or both. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179
F. Supp. 721, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
53. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 n.48 (1962).
54. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Asheville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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trade or to insure to the supplier a market for his output; and (3)
there is no trend toward concentration in the industry.55
The narrowness of the defense afforded by Tampa Electric becomes
apparent when consideration is given to the following facts of that
case: the market there involved was less than I per cent; the require-
ments contract was under attack by a private seller who would ordi-
narily benefit from the contract but in this case sought to invalidate the
entire contract so he could secure an increase in the price at which
he sold to a public utility; there was no evidence of any trend toward
concentration in the industries involved.
It is therefore extremely unlikely that there would be many Sec-
tion 3 Clayton Act cases attacking a requirements contract in factual
settings which are in any way similar to the one presented in Tampa
Electric. It is also unlikely that there will be any section 7 cases
attacking vertical mergers which meet the three conditions of Tampa
Electric as discussed above. It would be inconceivable to apply a less
strict rule to prevent vertical mergers than transitory contractual
arrangements.5 6
Thus the legality of most vertical mergers will be tested under
standards similar to those applied to tying contracts and even those
which are to be tested under more lenient standards must meet the
very narrow criteria of Tampa Electric as defined in Brown Shoe.
C. Standards Applied to Horizontal Mergers
Horizontal mergers occur between firms engaged in the production
or sale of comparable goods or services in the same geographic market.
Such mergers eliminate the competition which existed between the
parties. Prior to its amendment, section 7 focused upon this pre-
existing competition and proscribed acquisitions which might substan-
tially lessen competition between the acquiring and the acquired
firms.5 However, as Mr. Chief Justice Warren noted, the Celler-
Kefauver amendment made plain that such combinations were "to be
gauged on a broader scale: their effect on competition generally in an
economic market."5 8
Brown Shoe presented horizontal effects in 118 separate economic
markets, corresponding generally to separate city trade areas, where
Brown and Kinney each owned or controlled shoe stores which com-
peted with each other prior to the merger. In an appendix to its
55. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330-31 (1962).
56. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
57. The refusal of the courts to apply this test as written led to the adoption
of the Sherman Act approach under pre-1950 § 7.
58. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962).
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opinion the Court set out market shares of the Brown and Kinney
stores in each separate city for each of the lines of commerce found
by the Court, i.e., "men's," "women's," and "children's" shoes, each
considered separately, and concluded that in all 118 cities "the com-
bined shares of the market of Brown and Kinney in the sale of one of
the relevant lines of commerce exceeded 5 per cent. In 47 cities, their
share exceeded 5 per cent in all three lines."5 9
Before finding that the merger violated section 7 because of its hori-
zontal effects the Supreme Court found that the shoe industry was
fragmented, and then used the following language:
In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the control of
substantial shares of the trade in a city may have important
effects on competition. If a merger achieving 5% control were
now approved, we might be required to approve future merger
efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares.
The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered
and it would be difficult to dissolve the combinations previously
approved.60
Thus, horizontal integration in a fragmented industry is illegal if the
parties to the integration when combined will control substantial
shares of the trade. Five per cent control would be substantial in a
fragmented industry with the market structure of shoe retailing.
Later the opinion discusses other factors which "lend additional
support to the District Court's conclusion that this merger may sub-
stantially lessen competition."61 Such factors are the inability of
smaller retailers to compete with large chains and the prior horizontal
mergers between competitors. However it does not retreat from the
original position that illegality is established by measuring the market
share in relation to the market structure.
Accepting that under the standards of Brown Shoe any horizontal
integration between leading firms in a fragmented industry is illegal,
the obvious question is raised: "What standards are applied to hori-
zontal mergers in concentrated industries?" In answering this ques-
tion it will be assumed that there is no merger trend or proven inabil-
ity of small competitors although these factors would "lend additional
support" to a finding of illegality.
The clear Congressional purpose to prevent mergers which lead to
concentration would require that no less stringent standards be ap-
plied in concentrated industries than in fragmented industries. Under
the reasoning of Brown acceptance of horizontal integration by major
59. Id. at 343.
60. Id. at 343-44.
61. Id. at 344-45.
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firms62 in a concentrated industry would both add to existing concen-
tration and open the door to similar acquisitions by the acquiring
firm's competitors. This effect would be demonstrably more incon-
sistent to Celler-Kefauver than the horizontal effect of Brown-Kinney
since the concentrated industry would be much closer to oligopoly
than the fragmented shoe industry.
Horizontal mergers between significant firms in concentrated indus-
tries are, therefore, contrary to Celler-Kefauver. Indeed, even if the
acquired firm were not significant there might very well be a violation
depending upon the degree of concentration in the market.
The majority opinion is also silent on horizontal mergers occurring
in industries which are neither fragmented nor highly concentrated.
Here, too, the situation is analogous to Brown Shoe. In such market
setting the Court could not approve a merger between two signif-
icant factors, for if it did so it "might be required to approve future
merger effects" by competitors seeking similar market shares and "the
oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered."''O
Thus the practical application of Celler-Kefauver is very similar in
vertical and horizontal situations. In both the primary consideration
will be the market shares of the parties to the merger when viewed
against the relevant market structure. 4 Vertical mergers which fore-
close competition from a substantial market and horizontal mergers
which unite major competitors result in just such potential clogs as
the Clayton Act seeks to prevent.
D. Mergers Not Covered by Celler-Kefauver
Although it established rather rigid tests to be applied to vertical
and horizontal integration,65 the Brown Shoe opinion specified two
merger situations which would not be covered by Celler-Kefauver.
1. International Shoe Doctrine
Brown Shoe recognizes that the failing company defense is appli-
cable under Celler-Kefauver. This defense as formulated in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. FTC66 may be used in only the most desperate of
circumstances:
62. As in the case of vertical mergers the determination of whether a firm is
a major factor will not depend solely on market share. It will of course always
be necessary to measure the market share against the structure of a given in-
dustry.
63. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
64. Remaining vigor of competition will not justify a horizontal merger be-
tween two major firms or a vertical merger which results in foreclosure from a
substantial market. Id. at 333.
65. The Brown Shoe opinion did not discuss conglomerate mergers.
66. 280 U.S. 291 (1928).
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The evidence establishes the case of a corporation in failing cir-
cumstances, the recovery of which to a normal condition was, to
say the least, in gravest doubt, selling its capital to the only avail-
able purchaser in order to avoid what its officers fairly concluded
was a more disastrous fate.67
Here, according to the Court was a "corporation with resources so
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the
grave probability of a business failure . .. (there being no other
prospective purchaser) ..."a8
The rule of International Shoe case as applied in subsequent cases,
turns upon the ultimate determination (1) that the acquired firm was
one "hopelessly insolvent and faced with imminent receivership" and
(2) that the acquiring firm "was the only bona fide prospective pur-
chaser" for the acquired firm's business.6 9
Thus, the failing company defense available under Celler-Kefauver
is an extremely narrow one which only applies in those mergers in-
volving corporations in desperate financial straits, which have no
alternative purchaser other than a competitor.
2. Mergers of small companies
Brown Shoe also specifies that Celler-Kefauver does not proscribe
"a merger between two small companies to enable the combination to
compete more effectively with larger corporations dominating the
relevant market. ' 70
Such mergers would not ordinarily violate amended section 7 under
the tests discussed above. Obviously the classification "small com-
panies" would turn on the structure of a particular market, and "small
companies" within a market structure could not be classed as major
or significant competitors.
In no sense could the language in Brown Shoe be stretched to
cover situations such as the one presented in Bethlehem-Youngstown
where the second largest steel company sought to justify a proposed
acquisition by claiming it would then enter into "more meaningful
67. Id. at 301. (Emphasis added.)
68. Id. at 302.
69. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962). See also Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291
F.2d 279, 280-81 (3rd Cir. 1961); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654
(1962). Indeed, in those decisions allowing the defense, the acquired company
was either in or on the verge of bankruptcy. Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875
(7th Cir. 1943); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,
167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958) ; In e Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp.
829 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
70. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
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competition" with the largest firm in the steel industry. This approach
to section 7 would, as pointed out in the Bethlehem opinion, lead to
further increase in concentration and ultimately to oligopoly:
If there is logic to the defendants' contention that their joinder isjustified to enable them, in their own language, to offer "challeng-
ing competition to United States Steel... which exercises domi-
nant influence over competitive conditions in the steel industry"
then the remaining large producers in the "Big 12" could
with equal logic urge that they, too, be permitted to join forces
and to concentrate their economic resources in order to give more
effective competition to the enhanced "Big 2"; and so we reach a
point of more intense concentration in an industry already highly
concentrated-indeed, we head in the direction of triopoly.11
Acceptance of the Bethlehem Steel defense would be completely con-
trary to the declared Congressional intention to prevent mergers
which lead to increased concentration and oligopoly.
Brown Shoe specifically excludes the Bethlehem defense when it
distinguishes between "small companies" and the "larger corporations
dominating the relevant market." The "larger corporations" are the
significant firms. In the steel industry they would be the "Big
Twelve."
CONCLUSION
Celler-Kefauver resulted from serious concern over increasing con-
centration in the American economy and a strong intention by Con-
gress that all mergers are to be halted which tend materially to in-
crease such concentration or substantially to lessen competition. The
Supreme Court has shown the way to achieve vigorous enforcement
consistent with the purposes of the Clayton Act. It has also pointed
the way toward speedy disposition of cases under that statute without
the interminable trial and the lengthy economic inquiry which are
considered characteristic of the Sherman Act and which were once
considered necessary in section 7 proceedings.
Under the standards of the Clayton Act as set out in Brown Shoe
both horizontal and vertical mergers are in all probability illegal if
they involve firms which are significant when measured against the
market structure affected, or if the merger occurs in markets where
there is a marked trend toward increasing concentration. On the other
hand, Celler-Kefauver does not limit or curtail the International Shoe
defense in mergers involving "genuine" failing corporations provided
there are no alternate purchasers.
In addition, those mergers between two firms which are not com-
71. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). (Emphasis added.)
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petitively significant in a market which is dominated by a number of
much larger firms would not be challenged under amended Section 7.
In light of the clear Congressional pronouncement and the sharply
defined guide lines recently laid down by the Supreme Court, the
enforcement agencies are in a position to achieve strict and speedy
compliance with Celler-Kefauver in horizontal and vertical situations.
Similarly the private bar now has a strong precedent for urging their
clients to avoid those consolidations which cannot be reconciled with
the Clayton Act standards set out in Brown Shoe. It is to be hoped
that adherence to amended section 7 will not only preserve a freely
competitive economy but that it will also result in a new industrial
reliance upon internal growth, with an accompanying increase in plant
investment, employment and industrial output.
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